What Next for Venezuela?

The US military action removing Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and bringing him to New York for trial raises more questions than it answers. However, several principal issues – the future of the oil industry, challenges to the US’ ability to “run” Venezuela, and significant questions on the continuing power of officials of the Maduro regime and the possibility of elections in which the opposition can again win and now take power – have come into focus.

• Maduro’s trial will require the Administration to produce strong evidence of his personal involvement and that of his wife to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Despite having earlier called the Maduro government “illegitimate” and recognizing Edmundo González as the rightful President, the Administration has not moved quickly to promote democratic transition; instead, it says that the US is “in charge” and called on Acting President Delcy Rodriguez to support US actions.
• This will be a difficult balancing act for her as the pro-Maduro security and defense forces still hold great power in Venezuela and the Administration may be reluctant to intervene further. However, it wishes to rebuild the oil industry with US investment.
• Threats to other countries, including Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, and Denmark have colored the response to the military action and raise significant questions about regional and global security which could easily affect US business interests in those countries. Business should continue to monitor these evolving situations closely.

The Operation and the Trial of Maduro

From one perspective, the most analogous situation seems to be (or at least the Administration would argue) the invasion of Panama in 1989 after an election there which had been stolen by forces loyal to General Manuel Noriega. As with Venezuela, Noriega had also been wanted for involvement in drug trafficking and had been indicted in US courts (in Maduro’s case, an indictment in 2020 and a superseding indictment, with additional charges, in the hours before the military operation began).

In addition, the US had made several attempts to get Noriega to leave office voluntarily; efforts which Maduro has promoted until quite recently, telling a Spanish journalist that if the US wants “to seriously discuss an agreement to combat drug trafficking, we’re ready. If they want oil, Venezuela is ready for US investment, as with Chevron, whenever they want it, wherever they want it, and however they want it.”¹ Unlike with respect to Venezuela, however, Panama had declared that a state of war existed with the US before the invasion. The military action may also be viewed both as a continuation of the campaign against at least 35 alleged drug smuggling boats in international waters both in the Caribbean and the eastern Pacific.

Now that Maduro has been arraigned, the US will have to present direct evidence of his and his wife’s personal involvement in the crimes alleged in the indictment and prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, the basic standard in criminal law. While the defense may object to the court (and the US) holding personal jurisdiction over Maduro as a head of state, this is unlikely to succeed. However, it is also important to note that the Administration will have to prove, rather than simply assert, Maduro’s leadership of a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (“Cartel de los Soles”).² The trial will likely not be quick.

Venezuela’s Government – and Possible Changes

In July 2024, Venezuela held an election for President. The opposition candidate, former diplomat Edmundo González, who was standing in for opposition leader (and 2025 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Maria Corina Machado), won the election decisively; the opposition was able to obtain raw vote counts from a sufficient number of precincts in Venezuela to prove this. The US, along with many other countries, rejected the vote and has recognized González as the legitimate President.

Over the weekend, the President said the US would “run” Venezuela and even that the US was “not afraid of boots on the ground” in doing so, although what this means in practice remains very unclear. Secretary of State Marco Rubio later clarified that the US will enforce an “oil quarantine” on Venezuela so that “their economy will not be able to move forward until the conditions that are in the national interest of the United States and the interests of the Venezuelan people are met” but will not actively run the country other than through “leverage.”³ The Administration is presumably reluctant to intervene with further military action unless absolutely necessary and wants to reduce risk of US casualties, not least because of opposition to foreign wars among the President’s supporters.

Despite its earlier pronouncements on Maduro’s government, the Administration, which up to this point has not recognized Maduro’s victory as legitimate, has not taken steps to hasten the democratic transition. Instead, it has recognized that Vice President Delcy Rodriguez – a hardliner from Maduro’s party – is acting President under the Venezuelan Constitution because of Maduro’s absence from the country. Rodriguez’ brother, who is head of the National Assembly, has been a principal interlocutor with the US in recent negotiations. Despite Rodriguez’ role in an avowedly socialist party, she has reportedly built ties with foreign investors; she urged “cooperation” with the US on Monday.

However, the security and defense apparatus that kept Maduro in power remains largely in place. Whether they will be pliant in the face of prospective US control over the oil industry and whether they can keep order in the country are essential questions for the next few months, as popular pressure for real change in Venezuela is likely to accelerate, raising the prospect of significant social division.

Elections – and/or Chaos?

One key future event will be the expected return of Machado to Venezuela. Asked whether the Administration would support Machado, the President said “we’re going to have to look at it.” One possible outcome is that the Venezuelan Constitution requires new elections within 30 days if the President is unable to discharge the duties of the office in the first year of a new term. (In retrospect, for this reason, the end of the first year of Maduro’s term – January 10 – seems to have been a deadline around which the military operation could have been designed.)

But organizing elections in a short time would be difficult, and there is no guarantee that the election would be truly free and fair. The Administration seems to be looking to a longer timetable; the President said that “[r]ight now, what we want to do is fix up the oil, fix up the country, bring the country back, and then have elections.” He added that the US needs “total access. We need access to oil and other things in their country that will allow us to rebuild their country.” It seems unlikely that the US would engage in the kind of nation-building effort as in Iraq or Afghanistan; access to key economic sectors, however, raises the possibility of conflict with the defense and security sectors that have profited from government control of the economy, with Acting President Rodriguez in an uneasy position of having to satisfy both the US, to avoid the possibility of further military action and to gain sanctions relief that would help the economy, and the still-powerful security sector which could make governing Venezuela difficult or even foment chaos in the country.

Adding to the confusion, the Venezuelan Government published a decree on the “State of External Commotion,” which empowers the security forces for the next 90 days to capture and prosecute “any person involved in the promotion or support” of the US operation.

The Oil Industry

Chevron has the largest US presence in Venezuela, working with state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) and produces about 250,000 barrels per day. In an interview over the weekend, the President said that “we’re going to be very strongly involved in [the oil industry]” and that “[w]e’re going to have to have big investments by the oil companies to bring back the infrastructure.”

But repairing the oil industry will take significant investment and significant time, particularly given the effects of current (and for now, continuing) US and international sanctions, backed up with the promise of the “oil quarantine.” Currently, Venezuela produces just over one million barrels per day, a sharp decline from decades past, but it could expand that total significantly over time with increased investment. The US Energy Information Administration states that Venezuela’s oil reserves constitute about 303 billion barrels, the world’s largest.⁴

US companies, including ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips, whose properties had been nationalized in 2007, could seek to recover their assets and resume investment. Presumably US refineries would handle the bulk of Venezuelan oil, at least in the interim. PDVSA long predates the nationalization and may continue at least in some form. In November 2025, a court in Delaware approved the sale of shares of PDV Holding (a subsidiary of PDVSA that owns Citgo Petroleum Corporation) to Amber Energy, which will have to repay Citgo bondholders as a condition of the sale, which must now be approved by the US Treasury Department.⁵

The Geopolitical Context

The military action in Venezuela only adds to the uncertainty in the global landscape, both political and economic. It is also consistent with the Administration’s goal of US “dominance” of the Western Hemisphere reaffirmed in the recent National Security Strategy and specifically what it described as its “Trump Corollary”:

We want to ensure that the Western Hemisphere remains reasonably stable and well-governed enough to prevent and discourage mass migration to the United States; we want a Hemisphere whose governments cooperate with us against narco-terrorists, cartels, and other transnational criminal organizations; we want a Hemisphere that remains free of hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets, and that supports critical supply chains; and we want to ensure our continued access to key strategic locations. In other words, we will assert and enforce a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine.⁶

Most major countries condemned the recent action, at least rhetorically. French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot, while declining to support Maduro’s government, said that the action “contravenes the principle of the non-use of force that underpins international law” and apparently linked it to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, noting that a “growing number of violations of this principle” by permanent members of the UN Security Council “will have grave consequences for global security, sparing no one.” The spokesman for UN Secretary General António Guterres said that the action “constitute[s] a dangerous precedent,” somewhat restrained language given the dependence of the UN on US financial support.

China has a particularly strong interest in Venezuela as Venezuela’s principal customer for (sanctioned) oil. A high-level Chinese delegation in fact met with President Maduro on Friday, several hours before the US operation began. A successful US naval blockade would reduce China’s ability to access that oil and potentially lead to another source of friction in the US-China relationship, even if China is able to replace the actual supplies easily.

Latin America

More broadly, the action gives rise to fears that the world is splitting into spheres of influence, with China achieving a form of dominance in Asia and Russia having its own sphere. In Latin America, achieving the US goal is likely to be difficult. Even leaving aside the question of whether China will continue to have access to Venezuelan oil if the US is running the oil sector, China has grown significant influence in Latin America in the past decade, including close ties with its BRICS partner Brazil, a major new port in Peru, and even its recent purchase of Argentinian (rather than US) soybeans. It is unlikely to give up this influence easily.

The Administration is likely hoping that governments of the right, including the recent elections in Chile and Honduras, and forthcoming elections in Brazil and Colombia, will give it allies and a freer hand to do what it wants in the region, including commercial ties. But even governments of the right may prove reluctant to weaken growing ties with China, particularly if the US is no longer offering favorable access to its market.

Mexico and Drugs

The Administration’s focus on drugs will continue no matter what happens in the short term in Venezuela and no matter how the Supreme Court rules on the legality of the fentanyl-related tariffs on Canada, China, and Mexico. At a minimum, this will place greater pressure on Mexico and President Claudia Sheinbaum to combat drug trafficking in Mexico and drugs crossing the US southern border. This was reinforced by threats against Mexico over the weekend, with the President saying that “something will have to be done about Mexico,” adding that “we’d love Mexico to do it. They’re very capable to do it,” but the cartels are strong there. All this of course also takes place in the context of the Administration’s forthcoming decision as to whether to renew or renegotiate the US-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA). The Administration likely believes that pressure in one area also gives it greater leverage in other areas such as trade.

Cuba

Following the military action against Venezuela, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that he would be “concerned” if he were a Cuban official and added that “I’m not going to talk to you about what our future steps are going to be . . . . But I don’t think it’s any mystery that we are not big fans of the Cuban regime, who, by the way, are the ones that were propping up Maduro.” The President said that “I think Cuba is going to be something we’ll end up talking about, because Cuba is a failing nation right now, a very badly failing nation, and we want to help the people. . . . we want to also help the people that were forced out of Cuba and are living in this country.” This type of rhetoric is likely to continue and possibly escalate. The Cuban economy is very weak, and without some external support (such as Venezuela has provided on oil) will likely only get worse. This will force Russia (and perhaps China) to decide how much they want to support Cuba. The President’s words also imply that at least some Venezuelans and Cubans admitted to the US in recent years could lose their legal authorization to stay.

Colombia

The President’s interviews this weekend also continued threats in a long-running war of words with Colombian President Gustavo Petro, whom the President termed a “sick man” who is “not going to be doing it very long”; in response to a question, the President said an operation against Colombia “sounds good to me.” President Petro responded in strong language as well; Colombia denies that it is involved in drug trafficking. The Colombian Defense Minister invited Secretary Hegseth to Colombia to see the country’s efforts against drugs.

Greenland

In the interview this weekend, the President also said the US “need[s] Greenland” – a statement which has caused serious concern in Denmark, with Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen responding that “I have to say this very directly to the United States: it makes no sense to talk about the need for the United States to take over Greenland. The Kingdom of Denmark – and thus Greenland – is part of NATO and is therefore covered by the Alliance’s security guarantee. We already have a defense agreement . . . which gives the United States wide access to Greenland.” Highlighting the stakes, she added that “[i]f the United States decides to attack another NATO country, then everything would stop – that includes NATO and therefore post-World War II security,” while noting that her government is doing “all that is possible so that is not the case.”

Conclusion

Uncertainty pervades geopolitics as the world begins this New Year. Only three days into 2026, the situation again changed significantly, with ramifications for both US businesses and the broader US role in the world. In the meantime, significant questions remain about the future of Venezuela and the country’s ability to rebuild the oil industry that is key to its recovery. While the attack was largely consistent with other military actions of the Administration – short operations seeking to minimize the risk of US casualties to the degree possible – if the situation in Venezuela deteriorates, it may face difficult choices in the months ahead regarding the extent of US operations in the region.

Endnotes

1. “Maduro in Brooklyn Detention Center after U.S. Capture,” The Washington Post, Jan. 3, 2026. 
2. US Department of State, “Terrorist Designations of Cartel de los Soles,” November 16, 2025. 
3. Garrett Downs, “Rubio explains how US might ‘run’ Venezuela after Maduro’s ouster,” CNBC, Jan 4, 2026. 
4. US Energy Information Administration, “Venezuela,” Feb. 8, 2024. 
5. Marianna Parraga, “US judge authorizes sale of Citgo parent’s shares to Elliott affiliate,” Reuters, December 1, 2025. 
6. The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” November 2025, p. 5.