CED Newsletters & Policy Alerts

US Strikes Against Iran and the Rapidly Evolving Middle East Security Landscape

June 23, 2025

Action: On June 21, the US struck three Iranian nuclear facilities, including the underground complex at Fordow and facilities at Isfahan and Natanz. While the President stated that the strikes “completely and totally obliterated” the targeted nuclear facilities, the Pentagon’s public assessment stated that the sites suffered “extremely severe damage” and a “destruction of capabilities” at Fordow. Questions remain about the extent of damage to the facilities, Iran’s ability to restart its nuclear program, and most immediately about the extent of Iranian retaliation and prospects for a wider regional war. On June 23, Iran launched missiles at a US air base in Qatar, the largest US military installation in the Middle East. The US stated that no casualties resulted from the attack, which was reportedly intercepted by Qatar air defenses.

Trusted Insights for What’s Ahead^®:

• The President’s swift decision to target and strike these facilities in Iran, while possessing serious implications both in the region and back home in the US, may also provide insights for how the Administration is seeking to prioritize interests as the risk of escalation between Iran and Israel come to a head. While the US has not stated why the attack was launched earlier than the two-week self-imposed deadline the President provided for deciding about further US involvement, it is reasonable to assume that three factors could have played into the decision: first, the President’s desire for secrecy and flexibility, perhaps combined with a desire to cover a decision to strike; second, the reports of the failure of the European negotiating effort last week, in which Iran reportedly refused to discuss a halt to nuclear enrichment, thus signaling it would not comply with US demands for an end to the enrichment program; third, the success of earlier Israeli attacks against Iranian defenses likely reduced the risk of the operation to US personnel and military aircraft.
• The nature and scope of Iranian retaliation vis-à-vis US personnel and interests in the region will merit a wide array of responses from the US and allies. As the Israel-Iran conflict continues and Iran has promised “everlasting consequences” in response to US actions, questions arise about what retaliatory actions Iran may take. Iran has noted that US bases in the region are within “firing range.” Despite its June 23 attack on a US airbase, Iran may be cautious before taking further action that could draw Saudi Arabia, the UAE, or Bahrain (the headquarters of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet) into the war. Iran could turn to terror attacks or assassination campaigns in the region or the West. Iran’s proxies, including the Houthis in Yemen, could also participate in retaliation against US and allied interests, although the capabilities of some proxies have perhaps been weakened by ongoing conflicts in Gaza and on the Israel-Lebanon frontier.
• Direct US engagement further complicates regional dynamics in the Middle East. Despite longstanding opposition to Iran’s nuclear program, Arab states clearly fear the prospect of a wider war, with Saudi Arabia formally opposing the attack and the UAE expressing “deep concern.” Oman, a traditional interlocutor between Iran and the US, called the attack “a serious violation of international law.” Animating this concern is a traditional desire for stability on the part of the Gulf states. The attack and the potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz threaten that stability and oil revenues. How might Israel expand its campaign against Iran? Following Iranian attacks on Israel, including against civilian targets, escalation of the conflict was already likely in the short term.
• What states could be potential mediators between Iran and the US or Iran and the West more broadly? Oman and Qatar seem the most likely regional candidates. More broadly, could India (which has traditionally strong relations with the US) play a role? And what role could China – which brokered the resumption of diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023 – play? How will Russia decide to support Iran? Russia has offered to mediate between Israel and Iran – a step that would expand its involvement in the region dramatically after the end of the Russia-aligned Assad regime in Syria – but would Russia be prepared to provide arms to Iran? Iran has provided Shahed drones to Russia for use in its war in Ukraine, but Russia could also be worried about the prospects of a regional war at a time when it seeks stronger relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE? (Both Iran and the UAE are formal members of the BRICS grouping, while Saudi Arabia has been invited to join but has not yet joined).
• Is the US serious about the prospect of regime change in Iran, and what steps would be necessary to further that possibility? Israel expanded the course of its attacks to include targets linked to what it described as “state repression,” a policy which seems designed not only to inflict punishment on the Iranian state but to encourage regime change.
• What impact will the strikes have on the NATO Summit this week in The Hague? The Alliance has been concerned over the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon, while also focusing on threats from Russia and an increasingly interconnected concern over security in the Asia-Pacific region given China’s strategic alignment and “unlimited partnership” with Russia. European Allies had hoped to use the Summit as a reset of US-European relations with higher defense spending targets in response to US demands and Russia’s refusal to agree to a ceasefire, ideally pushing the US towards greater support for Ukraine. While the US strikes on Iran do not directly implicate NATO, Allies have already been divided over the war in Gaza. How the Summit addresses the conflict – and whether it, rather than defense spending or Ukraine – dominates discussions will be important issues to watch as the NATO Summit unfolds. It is also possible that Russia could moderate its public support for Iran until the Summit concludes, precisely for that reason.

• Questions have been raised by both Democratic and Republican Members of Congress as to whether the strikes should have been notified to Congress in advance and whether further US action in the region would require compliance under the War Powers Resolution (please see CED’s Policy Backgrounder on National Emergencies). Should Iran retaliate against US personnel, bases, or other interests, such as shipping, the role of Congressional involvement, including the consideration of supplemental appropriations related to the conflict, will become more prominent. It is also important that the Republican base supporting the President has been divided on the attack. How will this play out, particularly among Republican Members of Congress at odds with the Administration? Will Congress rally to support the President, or will concerns about involvement in a foreign war reduce the US’s potential scope for action?

Conclusion

Just a few weeks ago, the President visited the Gulf states and complimented their focus on business as a key driver of the region’s stability and prosperity, lamenting the US involvement in wars for nearly 20 years following the 2001 terror attacks. Now, with attacks on Iran, the situation is quite different. The US has once again become directly involved in a major military conflict in the region, and strong Iranian retaliation could easily lead to further escalation. Most immediately, the largest question is the extent of that retaliation. Attacks on US interests in Saudi Arabia or the UAE would pose the direct potential of those countries becoming involved.

While the President has stated he has little desire to become involved in a foreign war, these actions have raised that prospect. US support for normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia was reportedly conditioned on the US agreeing to formal security guarantees for Saudi Arabia; now, the extent of what those guarantees could mean potentially comes into the foreground should Iran choose to retaliate against targets there. The optimistic view is that Iran would decline to do so, knowing how its military capabilities have been reduced since the Israeli attacks began and taking a longer-term picture of its goals for the region and the hope for stable relations with the Gulf states that could promote Iran’s own stability. In this view, Iran would focus its retaliation solely on the countries that have attacked it – Israel and the US – and limit its regional retaliation to US forces in countries that would be unlikely to respond militarily themselves.